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1 Introduction
Over the last 20 years there has been a resurrection of a position in the
philosophy of mathematics - abstractionism, or Neo-Fregeanism - which aims
to provide a reduction of standard mathematical practice (or at least the
epistemology and ontology underlying such practise) in terms of abstraction
principles embedded within second-order logic. Recent attempts have shown
that arithmetic and analysis can be reduced to abstraction principles of the
relevant kind, although the prospects for set theory seem, at present, to be
less promising.1
Abstraction principles are second-order statements of the form:
AP@: (∀X)(∀Y )[@(X) = @(Y )↔ E@(X,Y )]
where “@” is a term-forming operator taking concepts as argument and pro-
viding objects as output and “E@” is an equivalence relation on concepts2.
A quick note on notation: “@” is used to represent arbitrary abstraction
operators. “§” is used to represent the extension- (or set-) forming operator,
and “]” will be used to represent numerical abstraction operators. Any
object that falls in the range of an abstraction operator “@” is called an
abstract, and, given a particular abstraction operator “@”, we will call terms
of the form “@(P )” @-abstraction terms, and the corresponding objects @-
abstracts.
Abstraction principles are taken to fix the truth conditions for identity
statements regarding abstracts (i.e. the truth conditions of the identity on
the left-hand side of the abstraction principle) in virtue of the equivalence
1Wright [1983] contains a formal and philosophical reduction of arithmetic to the ab-
straction principle known as Hume’s Principle. See Hale [2000] on analysis and Cook
[2001] for a critique, and Boolos [1989] and Cook [2003] for attempts to provide Neo-
Fregean accounts of set theory. Fine [2002] and MacBride [2000] contain good discussions
of various issues surrounding abstractionism.
2Here we restrict our attention to conceptual abstraction and ignore objectual abstrac-
tion principles such as the pairing or direction principles.
1
relation on the right-hand side. As a result, abstraction principles provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for abstracts of the same kind to be
identical. As has often been noted, however, abstraction principles are silent
with regard to the truth conditions of mixed identity statements of the form:
@(P ) = t
where “t” is not a term of the form “@(P )” for some “P”. This is the
(in)famous Caesar Problem, which Frege himself was aware of. When con-
sidering various means for defining number, he points out that:
...we can never, to take a crude example, decide by means of our
definitions whether any concept has the number Julius Caesar
belonging to it, or whether that same familiar conqueror of Gaul
is a number or not (Frege [1884], p. 68)
The Caesar Problem has received significant attention in recent years.3.
In this paper, however, we focus on a particular case of the Caesar Problem
that surprisingly has received little attention on its own.4 We can isolate
the problem by considering the following hypotheses:
1. All abstracts exist necessarily.
2. Only abstracts exist necessarily.
If we were to accept (1) and (2), then we could quickly dispense with the
traditional version of the Caesar Problem since (presumably) Caesar exists
contingently whereas numbers (and other abstracts) do not.
Of course, if the arguments to follow depended on these two theses,
then (1) and (2) stand in need of some motivation and defence. We will not
propose such a defence here, however (it is worth pointing out that, although
(2) seems to us plausible, the existence of sets of contingent objects renders
(1) questionable at best5). Instead, we will merely point out that even if we
were to accept (1) and (2), a version of the Caesar Problem remains.
While acceptance of (1) and (2) settles questions of identity of the form:
@(P ) = t
where “t” is a term not formed through abstraction (and the original ab-
straction principle settled the question when “t” is an @ -abstraction term),
3See e.g Wright [1983], Heck [1997], Mac Bride[2000] and Hale & Wright [2001b].
4Hale & Wright [2001b] and Fine [2002] are the notable exceptions. Fine’s ideas inform
the entire paper and have been previously discussed in Cook & Ebert [2004].
5Both claims have been subject to discussion within the neo-Fregean tradition. Claim
(1) has been challenged by Field (see Field [1993], and Hale [1994] for a reply). Thesis (2)
concerns the distinction between pure abstract objects and abstract objects more generally
(see Dummett [1981] for discussion).
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there remains the problem of determining whether “t” and “@(P )” co-refer
when “t” is an abstraction term formed by the application of some abstrac-
tion operator other than “@”.
The problem can be formulated as follows: Assume that we have two
distinct abstraction principles:
AP@1 : (∀X)(∀Y )[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀X)(∀Y )[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
The question at hand is how cross-sortal identity claims of the form:
@1(P ) = @2(Q)
(where “P ” and “Q” are particular concept-expressions) are to be decided
(here and below we will refer to such identities as cross-abstraction identi-
ties). Note that AP@1 and AP@2 are silent with regard to this question, and
the addition of principles (1) and (2) is equally unhelpful.
We call this restricted version of the Caesar Problem the C-R Problem,
since determining whether real numbers (i.e. R) might be identical to com-
plex numbers (i.e. C ) is one instance of the problem (just as determining
whether Julius Caesar is a number is merely one instance of the Caesar
Problem). While this label is both appropriate and somewhat catchy, it will
turn out to be more convenient to restrict our attention, in what follows, to
mathematical structures simpler than the real and complex numbers.
Importantly, even though the adoption of abstraction principles is usu-
ally associated with neo-Fregean philosophies of mathematics, one should
not underestimate the generality of the C-R Problem, as it is not restricted
to such views. Thus, although we will focus on abstractionism here, it is
important to note that any philosophy of mathematics that accepts the
truth of abstraction principles, even if not granting them the foundational
role that neo-Fregeans attribute to them, will be confronted with the C-R
Problem, since it owes us some story regarding how such cross-abstraction
identity claims are settled within their framework. Since most platonist (or,
more broadly, realist) views of mathematics, whether neo-Fregean or not,
will grant the truth of such statements (or at least the truth of the corre-
sponding Ramsey sentences), the present examination should be of general
interest. Furthermore, we shall argue that appeal to equivalence classes in
settling questions of cross-abstraction identity is problematic. Since this
seems like the ‘natural’ (or at least most prevalent) means by which to solve
this problem in some non-abstractionist frameworks (e.g. some variants
of structuralism), we contend that the conclusions drawn here are equally
relevant to platonists both Fregean and non-Fregean in character.
The remainder of this paper is partly formal and partly philosophical in
character. In the next section we will briefly outline two different formal
strategies (and their philosophical motivations) for dealing with the C-R
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Problem. The first strategy will, in deciding questions of cross-abstraction
identity, emphasize the role of the equivalence relations occurring on the
right hand side of the abstraction principles in question. The second strat-
egy, on the other hand, aims to settle this question in terms of the identity
of the ‘equivalence classes’ of concepts carved out by these equivalence re-
lations.
We will then focus on the second strategy and suggest three ways in
which this strategy might be implemented to solve the C-R Problem. This
strategy ultimately fails - each attempt to appeal to equivalence classes
faces insurmountable difficulties. The first option has absurd consequences.
(Interestingly we shall suggest along the way that this was Frege’s own
solution to the problem). The second option not only entails significant set-
theoretic consequences, but is also inconsistent with what is usually taken
to be a paradigm instance of an acceptable abstraction principle (namely
Hume’s Principle). Lastly, the third option is incompatible with a rather
intuitive metaphysical principle - the Principle of Uniform Identity - which
we motivate below.
2 Two Strategies
As previously mentioned, there are two broad strategies for dealing with
cross-abstraction identities: Given two abstraction terms @1(P ) and @2(Q)
(and associated abstracts) arising from two distinct abstraction principles,
we can, in deciding such identities, appeal to the identity of the correspond-
ing equivalence relations (i.e. E@1(P,Q) and E@2(P,Q)), or we can appeal
to the identity of the associated equivalence class of concepts. Let us briefly
examine the first strategy before focusing on the second.
The idea here is that, given two distinct abstraction principles:
AP@1 : (∀X)(∀Y )[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀X)(∀Y )[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
the cross-abstraction identity:
@1(P ) = @2(Q)
will be true if and only if:
“E@1(X,Y )” and “E@2(X,Y )” express the same equivalence re-
lation.
and:
E@1(P,Q)
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(or, equivalently, E@2(P,Q)). The details of this proposal depend on how
we flesh out the notion of “expresses the same equivalence relation”. One
straightforward means for doing so is to understand the relevant notion of
sameness in terms of straightforward equivalence, so that the cross-abstraction
identity is true if and only if:
(∀X)(∀Y )(E@1(X,Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )) ∧ E@1(P,Q)
(equivalently (∀X)(∀Y )(E@1(X,Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )) ∧ E@2(P,Q)).
There is an immediate problem with this approach, however. As Fine
[2002] points out, this manner of settling the truth conditions of cross-
abstraction identities entails that the numbers provided by Hume’s Prin-
ciple:
HP : (∀X)(∀Y )[](X) = ](Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
(where “X ≈ Y ” abbreviates the second-order claim asserting that X and
Y are equinumerous) and the numbers provided by Finite Hume :
FHP : (∀X)(∀Y )[](X) = ](Y )↔ (X ≈ Y ∨ (¬Fin(X) ∧ ¬Fin(Y )))]
(where “Fin(X)” abbreviates the second-order formulae asserting that X is
finite) are distinct, provided that the universe is uncountable. Intuitively,
however, the natural numbers provided by these two principles (if both
principles are acceptable) are identical - the natural numbers are a proper
sub-collection of the cardinal numbers.
Thus, settling cross-abstraction identities in terms of some notion of
‘sameness’ of the associated equivalence relations would seem to require a
more fine-grained approach to ‘sameness’. However, we will neither defend
the equivalence relation approach nor work out the details of such a view 6.
Instead we will outline the alternative strategy involving equivalence classes
and demonstrate that no version of this approach successfully solves the C-R
Problem.
The intuitive idea behind the second strategy is as follows: Given any
abstraction operator @ and any concept P , there is a collection of concepts
that ‘receive’ the same abstract as does P . In other words, speaking loosely,
given an abstraction operator @, we can associate with each concept P the
class of concepts whose @-abstracts are identical to the @-abstract of P
(here ⇒ represents an informal association):
@(P )⇒ {X : @(P ) = @(X)}
Utilizing the equivalence of “@(Q) = @(P )” and “E@(P,Q)” this becomes:
@(P )⇒ {X : E@(P,X)}
6See Cook & Ebert [in preparation] for an examination of these issues.
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The strategy that then suggests itself is the idea that cross-abstraction iden-
tities be decided in terms of the identity of the corresponding equivalence
classes.
Before exploring various ways to implement the equivalence class strat-
egy for solving the C-R Problem, however, we need to attend to a number
of logical and metaphysical issues that will play a crucial role in what is to
follow.
3 Methodology and Metaphysics
In this section we carry out a number of preliminary tasks. First, we out-
line a simple approach to handling abstraction principles that apply to
restricted domains, i.e. subdomains of the full range of the second-order
quantifiers. Next, we present two (essentially metaphysical) constraints on
cross-abstraction identities that, so we argue, any successful account of cross-
abstraction identity must satisfy. As we shall show, although all three vari-
ants of the equivalence class approach to the C-R Problem satisfy the first of
these, our primary objection to the third approach (the only formally plau-
sible one) will be its failure to satisfy the second metaphysical constraint.
3.1 Restricting Abstraction Principles
Given an abstraction principle:
AP@ : (∀X)(∀Y )[@(X) = @(Y )↔ E@(X,Y )]
we will, in what follows, often want to consider the restriction of that ab-
straction principle to a sub-domain of the original domain of application,
say those concepts picked out by the higher-order predicate “Φ”. One way
of achieving this is to replace the biconditional above with a conditional
whose consequent is the original abstraction principle, obtaining something
like7:
AP@2 : (∀X)(∀Y )[(Φ(X) ∧ Φ(Y ))→ (@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@(X,Y ))]
This way of proceeding presents two problems. First, the principle obtained
is not, as defined above, an abstraction principle at all, but rather a com-
plex conditional embedding an abstraction principle. Second, and more
worrisome, is the fact that the second-order variables here presumably still
range over all concepts, and thus the abstraction operator must take a value
on concepts which do not fall under the restriction Φ (something like this
problem underlies worries regarding notorious neo-Fregean objects such as
7See Heck [1997] for a discussion of the role of such conditional versions of abstraction
principles, including his variant of Finite Hume.
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anti-zero and the “Bad” extension)8. We could finesse such worries in a
number of ways, including adopting a free logic, or treating the referents as
logical fictions, but there are more elegant ways to proceed.
Given an abstraction operator @ with its associated abstraction principle
AP@, we can formulate a restriction of this operator to a subdomain picked
out by Φ by restricting the initial universal quantifiers to those concepts
falling under Φ. In other words, the restriction of AP@ to Φ will be:
AP@2 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(Y ))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@(X,Y )]
where:
(∀XΦ(X))Ψ
is true if and only if all concepts satisfying Φ satisfy Ψ. Since the variables
within the scope of such restricted quantifiers only range over the intended
concepts, we need not worry about the unintended existence of unwanted
“Bad” objects.
We can view everyday, unrestricted abstraction principles such as Hume’s
Principle as limiting cases of our notion of restricted abstraction principles,
where the initial quantifiers are restricted by a predicate holding of every
concept9. Thus, every abstraction principle, on the present approach, takes
the form:
AP@ : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(Y ))[@(X) = @(Y )↔ E@(X,Y )]
It is worth noting that our arguments won’t hinge on this notational vari-
ation, rather the notion of restricted abstraction principles merely provides
a simple and elegant notation for rather complicated formalisms.
With the notion of restriction in place, we can now formulate the two
principles we take to be minimal constraints on a correct theory of cross-
abstraction identity. It should be noted that there might be additional
constrains on a solution to the C-R Problem, but the two given below suffice
for our purposes here.
3.2 The Subsumption Constraint
As noted above, certain abstraction principles can be viewed as restrictions
of other, more general, abstraction principles. One particularly useful no-
tion regarding such restrictions is the idea that one abstraction principle
subsumes another. Given two abstraction principles AP@1 and AP@2 :
AP@1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀XΨ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
8See Boolos [1997].
9In what follows we will continue to write unrestricted second-order quantifiers without
the explicit restriction, i.e., “(∀X)Φ” is understood to be an abbreviation for a formula
such as “(∀X(∀z)(X(z)↔X(z)))Φ”.
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we will say that AP@1 subsumes AP@2 if and only if:
(∀X)(Ψ(X) → Φ(X))
(∀X)(∀Y )(E@1(X,Y ) ↔ E@2(X,Y ))
In other words, AP@1 subsumes AP@2 if and only if AP@2 is an accept-
able restriction of AP@1 and E@1(X,Y ) and E@2(X,Y ) agree on all pairs
of concepts. Note that the second clause of the definition of subsumption is
substantially stronger than the requirement that the two equivalence rela-
tions agree on the intersection of the two domains of application.
With the notion of subsumption in hand, we can place an additional
constraint on any account of cross-abstraction identity. Given any two ab-
straction principles AP@1 and AP@2 where AP@1 subsumes AP@2 , we should
expect the abstracts obtained from the concepts falling under the application
of both operators to be identical, i.e.:
(∀XΨ(X))(@1(X) = @2(X))
The intuition behind this constraint is the same as that which motivated our
earlier observation that (unrestricted) Hume’s Principle and Finite Hume
should generate the same finite cardinals: If AP@2 amounts to nothing more
than restricting AP@1 to a subdomain of its original domain of application,
then the abstracts generated on this subdomain should not change. It is
worth noting that if we reformulate Finite Hume as an explicitly restricted
version of Hume’s Principle:
FHP : (∀XFin(X))(∀YFin(Y ))[](X) = ](Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
then the Subsumption Constraint implies that abstracts generated by Finite
Hume are a subcollection of those generated by Hume’s Principle.10
3.3 The Principle of Uniform Identity
The basic idea encapsulated in the Principle of Uniform Identity can be
motivated by the following simple and intuitive thought. Assume two ab-
straction principles:
AP@1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀XΨ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
10One might abandon the Subsumption Constraint in favor of what Fine calls a “strictly
separated” notion of cross-abstraction identity where each distinct pair of (acceptable)
abstraction principles generate distinct ranges of objects. We do not explore this option
here for two reasons. First, this approach violates the rather plausible intuitions discussed
above. Second, however, implementing such an approach would require us to provide
precise criteria for deciding when two abstraction principles are distinct, criteria which
seem likely to cause the view to collapse into an account based on sameness of equivalence
relation (see Cook and Ebert [in preparation]).
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The idea is that, if it turns out that there is a concept on the shared domain
of application whose @1 abstract is identical to its @2 abstract, then, for
any concept in the shared domain, its @1 abstract will be identical to its @2
abstract.
As a motivational example, assume that one has two abstraction prin-
ciples, the first generating extensions (including the empty extension, or
set) and the other generating numbers (including, at least, zero). Further,
assume that our account of cross-abstraction identity implies that zero is
identical to the empty extension. Our intuition is that this is sufficient for
all numbers to be identical to some sets (or, less plausible, vice versa). It
would seem quite counterintutive (to say the least) to claim that some num-
bers introduced by, e.g. Hume’s Principle, are identical to the corresponding
sets while other numbers, again introduced by Hume’s Principle, are not.
We can formalize this idea more precisely in the following way: Given
two abstraction principles:
AP@1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀XΨ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
The following Principle of Uniform Identity should hold:
(∃XΦ(X)∧Ψ(X))(@1(X) = @2(X))→ (∀XΦ(X)∧Ψ(X))(@1(X) = @2(X))
This principle seems to us rather intuitive, which might be partly due to
a broadly realistic framework we both assume. We have found it difficult
to provide a further theoretical defense of the principle. Nevertheless, we
assume that the intuitive plausibility of the principle imposes a strong ex-
planatory burden on anyone who wishes to explicitly deny the thesis.11
4 Abstracts Are Equivalence Classes
One initially promising approach to solving the C-R Problem is to identify
the @-abstract of a concept P with the class of concepts that have the same
@-abstract, i.e.:
@(P ) = {X : E@(P,X)}
Within an abstractionist framework, however, we need to be a bit more
careful in formulation. First, we should note that sets or classes, like any
other mathematical entity, will on the present view themselves be abstracts,
so we will need to reformulate the above as something along the lines of:
@(P ) = §(Q)
11The centrality of the notion of sortal in Hale &Wright’s solution to the Caesar Problem
(Hale & Wright [2001b]) suggests that something like the Principle of Uniform Identity
is at work in their proposed solution to the Caesar Problem.
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where Q is itself a concept and § is the extensions (or set-forming) abstrac-
tion operator.
Intuitively, what we want is the extension of the concept holding of all
concepts that are E@-equivalent to P . In other words, loosely speaking we
want Q to hold of all concepts that obtain the same @ -abstract as P . The
extension operator only applies to first-level concepts, i.e. concepts that
have objects as instances, and thus Q cannot literally be a concept holding
of other concepts. With the extensions operator already in play, however,
we can rectify this by allowing Q to be the concept holding of the extension
of every concept that receives the same @-abstract as P , i.e.:
@(P ) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E@(P, Y )))
The use of an extension operator might already cause some doubt, since
the most well known abstraction principle for providing extensions, Frege’s
Basic Law V :
BLV : (∀X)(∀Y )[§(X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(X(z)↔ Y (z))]
is susceptible to Russell’s paradox. George Boolos [1989] has proposed a
means for dealing with this problem, however. The underlying idea is that
some concepts are not ‘well-behaved enough’ to be collected into sets, or to
have extensions, or to correspond to a unique abstract. Thus, we should
restrict Frege’s principle to certain ‘well-behaved’ concepts. The following
Restricted Law V schema captures Boolos’ general approach:
ResV : (∀X¬Bad(X))(∀Y¬Bad(Y ))[§(X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(X(z)↔ Y (z))]
Of course, the particular characteristics of the resulting set (or extension)
theory will depend on what particular definition of “Bad” we adopt, but we
need not get into such complexities here. All that we require for our purposes
is that, for any abstraction operator @, each of the equivalence classes as
described above will exist (and be well-behaved), i.e. for any principle AP@
where the initial second-order quantifiers are restricted to Φ, we have:
(∀XΦ(X))( ¬ Bad(X))
(∀XΦ(X))( ¬ Bad((∃Y )(x = §(Y ) ∧ E@(X,Y ))))
Simply put, the present view requires that any concept that has an ab-
stract of any sort has an extension, and any equivalence class of concepts
carved out by an acceptable equivalence relation corresponds to an extension
containing exactly the extensions of concepts in that class. While greatly
restricting how we might define “Bad” (and also thereby restricting what
other abstraction operators we might allow into the language), these claims
does not seem outright absurd.
The restriction is absurd, however, when combined with the account of
cross-abstraction identity that motivated it. Fine [2002] first noticed this,
writing:
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On what basis, then, could an abstract qua number and qua
class be judged the same? The only reasonable view that sug-
gests itself is that any abstract, associated through a means of
abstraction with certain items, is to be identified with the class
of those items. But...such a view leads to the absurd conclusion
that any class C of items is identical to the class of the concept(s)
whose extension is C ([2002] p. 47)
We can reconstruct Fine’s reasoning as follows. The idea that any ab-
stract is meant to be identified with the class of extensions of concepts
receiving that abstract was meant to be entirely general, so, in particular,
it applies to extensions themselves (without such generality we would have
no means for deciding when particular extensions are or are not identical to
other abstracts). Thus, for any non-“Bad” concept X:
§(X) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E§(X,Y )))
I.e.:
§(X) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ (∀w)(X(w)↔ Y (w))))
This, in turn, is equivalent to:
§(X) = §(x = §(X))
Thus, if an abstract @(P ) is identified with the equivalence class of concepts
whose abstract is @(P ), then we obtain the absurd conclusion that every
non-“Bad” extension is identical to its singleton.12 This implies that the
only non-”Bad” concepts, and thus the only concepts to receive abstracts of
any kind, are concepts with a single instance.
Since the present proposal presupposes the acceptability of at least some
abstraction operators, and presumably one of these abstraction operators
will generate at least one object that is not its own singleton, we cannot
identify abstracts with their corresponding equivalence classes.
5 Historical Interlude
The idea that abstracts are to be identified with their associated equivalence
classes (understood in terms of extensions as above) traces back to Frege’s
own treatment in the Grundlagen, where he gives his explicit definition of
numbers:
12The assumption that every object is identical to its singleton is not contradictory.
Letting our instance of Restricted Law V be:
ResV : (∀X(∃!z)(X(z)))(∀Y(∃!z)(Y (z)))[§(X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(X(z)↔ Y (z))]
we can construct models which satisfy the account of identity proposed above by letting
the extension of each singleton property be the object that is its only instance.
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My definition is therefore as follows:
The number which belongs to the concept F is the extension of
the concept “equal to the concept F” (pp. 79-80)
(where, with Frege, we understand two concepts being equal in terms
of there being a one-one correspondence between the two, see Grundlagen
section 72). Thus, the number of a concept F is the extension of the concept
holding of (the extension of) every concept equinumerous with F .
Frege, immediately prior to his definition of number, identifies the di-
rection of a line a with the extension of the concept “parallel to line a”,
and identifies the shape of a triangle t with the extension of the concept
“similar to triangle t (p. 79). It is therefore clear that Frege means the
identification of abstracts with the relevant equivalence classes to be gen-
eral, so that (in the second-order case) the @-abstract of a concept F is the
extension holding of the concept holding of all extensions of all concepts G
such that E@(F,G). With this observation in hand, we can make two novel
observations regarding Frege’s logicist reconstruction of mathematics.
First, commentators have often expressed puzzlement that Frege’s defi-
nition of number as a species of extension comes at the end of a prolonged
discussion of the Caesar Problem (Grundlagen sections 60 - 69), since this
maneuver only seems to postpose the problem - we then need an account of
why extensions cannot be identical to Roman emperors. We can now view
Frege’s intentions a bit more charitably, however. Frege’s identification of
abstracts with extensions can be seen as not only a reduction of the Casear
Problem for abstracts in general to the specific case of extensions, but also
as an attempted solution to what we have here called the C-R Problem.
As we have seen however, the proposed solution fails. Thus, there are
two paradoxes lurking in Frege’s Grundlagen and Grundgesetze. The first
is Russell’s paradox, the contradiction lurking in Basic Law V. Even if this
problem is patched (perhaps by replacing Basic Law V with a Boolos-style
restriction of it) there is a second contradiction, involving the incompatibility
of Frege’s definition of abstracts as extensions (which implies that every
extension is identical to its singleton) with his claim that zero (i.e. the
number of the empty concept) exists (see, e.g. Grundlagen p. 88). The
existence of zero implies that the empty concept has a number, which, on
the view of identity proposed in the last section, implies that the empty
concept has an extension. The empty extension, however, cannot (on pain
of contradiction) be identical to its singleton.
6 Abstracts Are Not Equivalence Classes (ECIA1)
Abandoning the idea that we can solve the C-R Problem by identifying
abstracts with their corresponding equivalence classes need not cause us to
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abandon the idea that the truth of such identities varies with the identity
of the equivalence classes.
In order to formulate an acceptable version of this idea, we need only
note that we adopted the identification of abstracts and extensions such as:
@1(P ) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E@1(P, Y )))
@2(Q) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E@2(Q,Y )))
in order to move to the following biconditional:
@1(P ) = @2(Q) ↔
§((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E@1(P, Y ))) = §((∃Y )(z = §(Y ) ∧ E@1(Q,Y )))
Here we investigate the option of adopting this biconditional itself as our
account of cross-abstraction identity, instead of deriving it from a prior,
explicit account of the identity of arbitrary abstracts. Thus, given two
abstraction principles:
AP@1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀XΨ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
cross-abstraction identities are settled via what we will call the Equivalence
Class Identity Axiom 1 :
ECIA1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΨ(Y ))[@1(X) = @2(Y ) ↔
§((∃Z)(w = §(Z) ∧ E@1(X,Z))) = §((∃Z)(w = §(Z) ∧ E@1(Y, Z)))]
As in section 4, such an approach will require us to adopt some version of
Boolos’ Restricted Law V. As before, the approach requires that the equiv-
alence class of (extensions of) concepts corresponding to an abstract itself
be non-“Bad”, i.e. for any principle AP@ where the initial second-order
quantifiers are restricted to Φ, we again have:
(∀XΦ(X))( ¬ Bad(X))
(∀XΦ(X))( ¬ Bad((∃Y )(x = §(Y ) ∧ E@(X,Y ))))
Here it is worth noting that the proposed account satisfies the Subsumption
Constraint - given two abstraction principles where the first subsumes the
second, the abstracts generated on their shared domain of application will
be identical. Unlike the previous account, no outright absurd consequences
follow from ECIA1
We do, however, obtain some rather surprising results. Consider the
claim that equivalence classes of (extensions of) concepts must be non-“Bad”
if the associated abstracts are, and apply it to the extension operator itself,
obtaining:
(∀X¬Bad(X))(¬Bad((∃Y )(x = §(Y ) ∧ E§(X,Y ))))
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which is just:
(∀X¬Bad(X))(¬Bad((∃Y )(x = §(Y ) ∧ (∀w)(X(w)↔ Y (w)))))
i.e.:
(∀X¬Bad(X))(¬Bad(x = §(X)))
This, however, states that the concept holding solely of the extension of a
non-“Bad” concept is itself non-“Bad”, i.e. the singleton of any extension is
also an extension. Thus, this account of cross-abstraction identity gives us
arbitrary singletons of extensions for free.
Actually, we get quite a bit more than this, as the following example
will illustrate. Assume that (in addition to an appropriate version of Re-
stricted Law V ) unrestricted Hume’s Principle is an acceptable abstraction
principle:
HP : (∀X)(∀Y )[](X) = ](Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
Now, since
(∀XΦ(X))(¬Bad(X))
(and in the case of unrestricted Hume’s Principle, Φ(X) is(∀y)(X(y) ↔
X(y))) it follows that:
(∀X)¬Bad(X)
Of course, Restricted Law V is restricted to the non-“Bad” concepts, so, if
the non-“Bad” concepts are just all concepts, then we have an instance of
Basic Law V. In other words, on this view unrestricted Hume’s Principle
is inconsistent, contrary to the widespread view that Hume’s Principle is a
paradigm instance of an acceptable abstraction principle, if anything is.
Further assume that we have some restricted version of Hume’s Princi-
ple:
HP : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[](X) = ](Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
where the empty property and all properties with only a single instance fall
in the domain of application:
(∀X)((∀y)(∀z)((X(y) ∧X(z))→ y = z)→ Φ(X))
Now, since
(∀XΦ(X))(¬Bad(X))
it follows that:
¬Bad(x 6= x)
In other words, the empty set exists. Additionally, since any concept with
exactly one instance has a number, it follows that all single instance concepts
have extensions. Combining this with:
(∀XΦ(X))(¬Bad((∃Y )(x = §(Y ) ∧X ≈ Y ))))
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provides an extension holding of all single membered extensions, i.e. the
extension (or set) of all singletons.13
Thus, combining ECIA1 with a very weak version of the number ab-
straction principle implies some surprisingly strong theorems regarding ex-
tensions. In particular, we get that the empty extension (set) exists, that
the singleton of any abstract (and thus of any extension) exists, and that
the (infinite) extension of all singletons exists. This (of course) via Rus-
sell’s paradox style reasoning, rules out the truth of the separation axiom
for extensions.
Thus, although there is nothing inconsistent about this approach, it does
entail substantial set-theoretic principles. Such a result is surprising, since
we have (presumably) said nothing significant at this point about extensions,
and merely adopted a simple account of cross-abstraction identity. Such a
situation might make us wary of any attempt to settle cross-abstraction
identities in terms of the identities of the corresponding equivalence classes,
understood in this context to be extensions (thereby privileging one sort of
abstract over the rest).
7 No Need For Equivalence Classes (ECIA2)
In the previous sections we have explored ways of settling cross-abstraction
identities in terms of the identity of the corresponding equivalence classes,
where we took the existence of such classes seriously, defining them to be
certain extensions (and thus assuming that such extensions existed in or-
der to do the work required of them). Abandoning explicit use of exten-
sions, however, need not force us to abandon the more general idea that
cross-abstraction identities are to be settled in terms of whether or not the
abstracts in question correspond to the same ‘collection’ of concepts. The
question facing us at this point is how to formulate such an idea without
the use of extensions.
The answer is that we can paraphrase away all reference to the equiva-
lence classes. The initial idea was that a cross-abstraction identity:
@1(P ) = @2(Q)
is true if and only if the corresponding equivalence relations are identical:
{X : E@1(P,X)} = {X : E@2(Q,X)}
Ignoring for the moment what sort of entity such equivalence classes might
be, the above is, by (a second order analogue of) the axiom of extensionality,
13Note that this result can be adapted to show that, on the present account of identity,
any instance of Restricted Law V (such as NewV ) which implies that there are no non-
“Bad” concepts equinumerous with the universe is inconsistent with any restricted version
of Hume’s Principle that implies the existence of any number other than 0.
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equivalent to:
(∀Y )(Y ∈ {X : E@1(P,X)} ↔ Y ∈ {X : E@2(Q,X)})
which, intuitively, is just:
(∀Y )(E@1(P, Y )↔ E@2(Q,Y ))
Thus, we can eliminate all explicit talk of equivalence classes themselves in
favor of the above biconditional.14 Given any two abstraction principles:
AP@1 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[@1(X) = @1(Y )↔ E@1(X,Y )]
AP@2 : (∀XΨ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@2(X) = @2(Y )↔ E@2(X,Y )]
cross-abstraction identities are settled by the Equivalence Class Identity Ax-
iom 2 :15
ECIA2 : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΨ(X))[@1(X) = @2(Y )↔ (∀Z)(E@1(X,Z)↔ E@2(Y, Z))
(Note that the internal second-order universal quantifier “(∀Z)” is unre-
stricted.)
We can get a feel for the content of the ECIA2 by examining a particular
instance. Consider Hume’s Principle and the instance of the Restricted Law
V schema known as NewV :
NewV : (∀X¬Big(X))(∀Y¬Big(Y ))[§(X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(X(z)↔ Y (z))]
(Where “Big(X)” is an abbreveation for the second-order formula asserting
that X is equinumerous to the entire domain.) Given the relevant instance
of the Equivalence Class Identity Axiom 2 :
(∀X)(∀Y¬Big(Y ))[](X) = §(Y )↔ (∀Z)(E](X,Z)↔ E§(X,Z))]
i.e.:
(∀X)(∀Y¬Big(Y ))[](X) = §(Y ) ↔ (∀Z)(X ≈ Z ↔ ((∀z)(X(z)
↔ Y (z)) ∨ (Big(X) ∧Big(Y )))))]
we can prove:
](X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(¬X(z) ∧ ¬Y (z))
14One might have epistemological worries regarding an account motivated in terms of
entities, i.e. equivalence classes, whose existence is then ‘paraphrased’ away. We will not
dwell on this issue however, since as we shall see, there are deeper problems with this
strategy.
15This principle is adopted by Fine [2002], although its incorporation into his account
owes more to its mathematical elegance than any deep philosophical commitment.
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In other words (assuming for the sake of argument that these are both
acceptable abstraction principles), the number 0 is identical to the empty
set ∅, and no other number is identical to any other extension.16 This result
should strike one as rather surprising.
Recall that we required that any account of cross-identity abstraction
should be consistent with the Principle of Uniform Identity, which asserts
that, given two abstraction principles AP@1 and AP@2 (restricted to Φ(X)
and Ψ(X) respectively):
(∃XΦ(X)∧Ψ(X))(@1(X) = @2(X))→ (∀XΦ(X)∧Ψ(X))(@1(X) = @2(X))
ECIA2 is consistent with this claim, since we can suppose that some version
of Restricted Law V is the only acceptable abstraction principle (thus ren-
dering the Principle of Uniform Identity, and the issue of cross-abstraction
identity, irrelevant). The problem lies, however, in the fact that ECIA2
plus the Principle of Uniform Identity renders the simultaneous existence
of both zero and the empty set extremely problematic.
Assume that both zero and the empty set exist, i.e. some instance of
Restricted Law V :
ResV : (∀X¬Bad(X))(∀Y¬Bad(Y ))[§(X) = §(Y )↔ (∀z)(X(z)↔ Y (z))]
where the empty concept is not-“Bad”, and any restricted version of Hume’s
Principle:
HP : (∀XΦ(X))(∀YΦ(X))[](X) = ](Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
where the empty concept falls under Φ. Given these principles, ECIA2 tells
us that the empty set (§(¬x = x)) and zero (](¬x = x)) both exist and are
identical. As a result, if we assume the Principle of Uniform Identity, it
follows that no concept (other than the empty one) can both be non-“Bad”
and fall under Φ (since non-empty concepts will correspond to different
equivalence classes relative to Restricted Law V and Hume’s Principle and
thus no concept (other than the empty one) can have both a number and an
extension. As a result, the abstractionist who adopts ECIA2 is faced with
a rather uncomfortable trilemma:
[1] One of zero and the empty set fails to exist.
[2] No concept, other than the empty one, has both a number
and an extension (i.e. set).
[3] The Principle of Uniform Identity fails.
16Note that, on the present way of formulating things, we need not worry about the
possible identity of the “Bad” extension and anti-zero, since only the latter exists.
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Presumably, for an abstractionist looking to provide a foundation for
mathematics based on the existence of abstract objects, access to which is
given by abstraction principles, accepting [2] is a non-starter, and [1] would
seem to fare little better. Thus, ECIA2 seems to imply the failure of the
Principle of Uniform Identity.
8 Conclusion
As we have seen, all three ways of pursuing the idea that cross-abstraction
identities can be settled in terms of the identity of the corresponding class
of concepts fail. Identifying abstracts with the corresponding equivalence
classes leads to absurdities; allowing the identities to co-vary with the iden-
tities of the corresponding classes understood as extensions turned out both
to be incompatible with unrestricted Hume’s Principle and to imply signif-
icant set-theoretic principles; and paraphrasing away the existence of these
classes in terms of second-order quantification left us with a view that is
incompatible with the Principle of Uniform Identity. We see no other way
of implementing the idea that cross-abstraction identities be settled in terms
of sameness of the corresponding ‘collection’ of concepts.
As a result the proponent of such an approach would seem to have no
other option than to accept ECIA2 and find some independent reason for
rejecting the Principle of Uniform Identity. However, for the considerations
sketched earlier, we are doubtful that principled reasons can be given for
abandoning this basic metaphysical principle.
Thus, the only other option for solving the C-R Problem is to invoke
sameness of equivalence relations (as sketched in section 2). Successfully
carrying out a defence of this idea will require, among other things, a formal
account of the notion of identity between equivalence relation. We plan on
addressing this problem in a sequel.17
17Versions of this paper were given at the workshop on Relations, Variables and Order
at the University of Geneva and at the Arche´ Research Seminar at the University of
St Andrews. We thank both audiences for valuable comments. Additional thanks go to
Kit Fine, Philipp Keller, Fraser MacBride, Daniel Nolan, Josh Parsons, Nikolaj Pedersen,
Agust´ın Rayo, Marcus Rossberg, Robbie Williams and Crispin Wright. This paper was
written while Roy T. Cook held an AHRB research fellowship at Arche´: The AHRB
Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Mind at the University
of St. Andrews.
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